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Congress' Property Clause Power to
Prohibit Taking Endangered Species
BY SOPHI AKINs*
I. Introduction
The delineation of Congressional authority by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Lopez1 and United States v. Morriso2 raises
significant questions regarding Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause3 to enact environmental statutes such as the Endangered
Species Act4 (hereinafter "ESA")' In Lopez, the Court reined in
Congress' commerce power6 by holding that Congress may only
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
University of California San Diego, 1997.
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress "to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-44 (1999).
5. Compare Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on
Environmental Regulation, 7 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321, 359-60 (1997) (stating that
"to pass Lopez muster, the degradation or modification of an endangered species' habitat
would have to be found an 'economic activity' having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce"), J. Blanding Holman, IV, Note, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean
Water Act and the Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA.
ENVrj.. L.J. 139, 185 (1995) (arguing that the Lopez Court would hold the links between
habitat-modification and interstate commerce insufficient to justify the enactment of the
ESA under Congress' commerce power), and David A. Linehan, Note, Endangered
Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable Habitat For
Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 365, 423-26 (1998)
(asserting that the ESA is not commercial in nature and the Court would reject the ESA
as outside Congress' commerce power), with Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez:
A Misstep, But Hardly Epochal For Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 33, 81-82 (1996) (arguing that the Court would uphold the ESA because the extinction
of a species that could potentially benefit society, through medicine and research, has a
potentially substantial effect on interstate commerce).
6. Before Lopez, "you wonder why anyone would make the mistake of calling it the
Commerce Clause instead of the 'Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause."' Alex
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regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce
and activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce.7 Five
years after Lopez, the Court in Morrison reaffirmed Lopez, stating
that the Commerce Clause supports only Congress' regulation of
activities that are economic in nature.8
Environmental statutes enacted at the beginning of the twentieth
century would have arguably passed the "substantial effect"
requirement because their primary function was to protect commerce
by regulating economic activities.9 Since then, however, Congress has
used its commerce power to enact environmental regulations, like the
ESA, that protect commerce as a secondary goal. 0 The ESA is
controversial because it prohibits private individuals from harming
endangered species on their land." In analyzing whether the ESA
"substantially affects" interstate commerce, it is not surprising that
people ask, "what [do] cave beetles and blind salamanders have to do
with interstate commerce?,
12
In contrast with its delineation of Congress' commerce power in
Lopez and Morrison, the Court has broadly interpreted Congress'
power under the Property Clause." The Property Clause allows
Kozinski, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1995); see also Richard A. Epstein,
Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167, 168 (1996)
(characterizing Lopez as a dramatic "about face"). Before Lopez, the last time the
Supreme Court struck down a regulation as exceeding the scope of Congress' commerce
power was in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
7. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
8. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
9. See Rivers and Harbors Act, ch. 425, 9-25, 30 Stat. 1151-55 (1899) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 401-18 (1997)) (enacting because too much refuse in the water could obstruct
the flow of commerce in the waterway); Lacey Act, Ch. 553, § 1, 31 Stat. 187 (1900)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 3371-3378 and 18 U.S.C. § 42 (1988))
(forbidding the interstate transport of animals killed in violation of state law). For more
on the history of American wildlife and plant law see Holly Doremus, Comment, Patching
the Ark- Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 287-
305 (1991).
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1999). But see Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural
Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 (1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (asserting that "a
national program to protect and improve the natural habitats of endangered species
preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in these species and of interstate
movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature").
11. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1999).
12. Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and
Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76
TEx. L. REV. 1125,1125 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Camfield v. United States,
167 U.S. 518 (1897).
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Congress the "[p]ower to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States."'4  The scope of Congress' property power is
significant, considering that nearly one-third of land in the United
States is owned by the federal government."5 More importantly, the
Court has upheld Congress' regulation, under the Property Clause, of
private activity on private land because it impacted public land.6
This note discusses the constitutionality of Congress' power to
prohibit the harming of endangered species under the Commerce and
Property Clauses. Part II examines the history of the Court's
interpretation of Congress' commerce power, culminating in the
recent Morrison decision. Part Ill determines that the ESA's
prohibition against harming endangered species is unconstitutional
because endangered species are not economic in nature and do not
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Part IV studies
Congress' broad power to regulate federal, as well as private, lands
under the Property Clause. Part V concludes that the Property
Clause is a logical source of congressional authority to restrict private
activity on private land where it may harm endangered species.
H. The Evolution of Congress' Commerce Power
A. The Expanse of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden
To understand the implications of Lopez and Morrison on the
constitutionality of the ESA, it is necessary to examine the history of
the Court's construction of Congress' Commerce Clause power.17
One of the first notable Commerce Clause cases was Gibbons v.
Ogden.'8 At issue in Gibbons was the federal government's right to
license steamboat operations in New York waters when New York
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
15. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS 11 (1999). Public lands represent about one-half of the land mass of the
eleven western states in the lower forty eight, and about two-thirds of Alaska. See
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & JOHN D. LESHY, FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 11 (4th ed. 2001).
16. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. 529; Camfield, 167 U.S. 518.
17. This Note only requires a general understanding of the primary Commerce Clause
doctrines. For a more comprehensive analysis of the Commerce Clause see BORIS I.
BrITKER, BnrKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
(1999).
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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state had granted a monopoly to a particular operator."9 The Court
stated that Congress' commerce power "acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the Constitution."' The Court held that
the federal statute under which Gibbons held his license was a
constitutional exercise of the commerce power because Congress has
the power to regulate both intrastate activities affecting interstate
commerce and interstate commerce. 21  The Court, however,
acknowledged that the states have the sole ability to regulate
completely intrastate commerce. Those activities falling outside of
Congress' commerce power were those "which are completely within
a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it
is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the
general powers of government. ' 3
B. Post-Gibbons, Pre-Lopez- Scope of Congress' Commerce Clause
Power
After Gibbons, the Court used various approaches to regulate
Congress' commerce power, culminating in Wickard v. Fillburn,4
which was "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority over intrastate activity."' In 1914, the Court
revisited the question of the scope of Congress' commerce power in
Houston, E. & W. Texas Railway Company v. United States (the
Shreveport Rate Case).' The Shreveport Rate Case was decided
during a time of significant technological change. 7 Advances in
technology and transportation revolutionized industry with the result
that business activities once purely local in nature became national in
scope.? In the Shreveport Rate Case, the Interstate Commerce
Commission imposed regulations on railroads to prevent railroads
from charging lower rates for intrastate transportation of goods than
for interstate transportation. The railroads challenged the
19. See id.
20. Id. at 196.
21. See id. at 186-98.
22. See id. at 195.
23. Id. at 195.
24. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
25. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
26. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
27. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
28. See id.
29. See Shreveport Rate, 234 U.S. at 346.
Commission's authority to do so under the Commerce Clause.' The
Court upheld the disputed regulations stating that Congress can
regulate the instruments of commerce if the regulated activities have
a "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce. ' '31  The
Court rationalized that the lower rates, although purely local,
discouraged interstate shipping and, thus, had a substantial effect
upon interstate commerce.3 2
Around the time it decided the Shreveport Rate Case, the Court
also used formalistic approaches to invalidate legislation it considered
outside the scope of Congress' commerce power.3 For instance, in
several cases, the Court distinguished between "manufacturing" and
"commerce" to strike down legislation. In United States v. E.C.
Knight Co..' the Court held that sugar manufacturers were outside
the reach of the Sherman Act because sugar manufacturing had too
indirect an effect upon commerce. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,35 the
Court struck down a statute prohibiting the interstate shipment of
goods produced by child labor because the statute regulated
"manufacturing" and not "commerce."
The Court also drew distinctions between "indirect" and "direct"
effects on commerce, holding that only activities with a direct effect
on commerce could be regulated.' In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the
Court struck down the congressional regulation of miners' wages and
working hours because the miners' wages and hours only had a
secondary and indirect effect on interstate commerceY However, the
Court abandoned the indirect and direct effects test a year later in
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. In
Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court also discarded the "manufacture"
and "commerce" distinction enunciated in E.C. Knight Co. and
30. See id. at 350.
31. Id. at 355.
32. See id
33. See Warner, supra note 5, at 327.
34. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
35. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116
(1941).
36. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936); Railroad Ret. Bd. v.
Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (holding that the regulation of pension and retirement
plans of railroad workers was remote from commerce); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (finding that the regulation of wages and hours have no
direct relation to interstate commerce).
37. 298 U.S. at 309.
38. 301 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1937).
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Hammer, stating that labor relations are within the scope of
Congress' regulation." The Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel, upheld
the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
because Congress' commerce power extends to regulation of
intrastate activities that have a "close and substantial relation" to
interstate commerce.40 The Court abandoned the formalistic tests in
Jones & Laughlin Steel for a level of analysis that more liberally
construed Congress' Commerce Clause power.
The apex of the Court's expansive interpretation of Congress'
commerce power came in Wickard v. Filburn.41 In Wickard, the Court
found that Congress could constitutionally reach into Filburn's farm
plots and regulate the wheat Filburn grew for his farm's use."
Filburn's individual wheat growing certainly had little or no impact on
interstate commerce. However, the Court examined the cumulative
effects of those similarly situated as Filburn and Filburn's home-
grown wheat on interstate commerce.43 The Court rationalized that
the cumulative effect of home-consumed wheat "would have a
substantial influence on price and market conditions."" Wickard is
significant because the Court allowed the regulation of a wholly
intrastate activity because, as a class of activities, it cumulatively had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. It is from the broad
construction of the Commerce Clause in Wickard that the Court
dramatically departed, fifty-three years later in Lopez.
C. Congress' Commerce Power in United States v. Lopez
In Lopez, the Gun-Free School Zones Act (hereinafter "Act")
was challenged as an unconstitutional extension of Congress'
commerce power.4" The Act makes it a federal offense for anyone to
knowingly possess a gun in a school zone.47 The Court in Lopez
explained that there are "three broad categories of activity that
39. Id. at 36-37.
40. Id. at 37.
41. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). "Wickard... is perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
42. 317 U.S. at 128.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
46. 514 U.S. at 551.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Congress may regulate under its commerce power."' First, Congress
may enact laws that regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce to keep them "free from immoral injurious uses"; second,
Congress may regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce; and third, Congress may
regulate activities that substantially effect interstate commerce.49
The first two tests are rather straightforward. Congress can
regulate the channels of commerce, such as motels,5" and the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, like railroad rates in the
Shreveport Rate Case.5' The Court quickly dismissed the Act as not
falling into either of the first two categories of permissible
legislation. 2 The Court then examined whether the Act regulates
activity that has a "substantial affect" on interstate commerce.5 3 The
Court considered the government's arguments that the possession of
a gun in a school zone may result in violent crime, thus affecting
interstate commerce by increasing the costs of insurance and reducing
the willingness of people to travel to unsafe areas.' However, the
Court established an analytic framework (later used in Morrison) to
invalidate the Act.
First, the Court analyzed the activity being regulated in the Act:
the possession of a gun in a school zone.55 The Court held that
regulating gun possession in itself is not economic and rejected the
Act as a criminal statute having nothing to do with interstate
commerce.56 Second, the Court looked at the legislative history of the
Act to see if there were facts relating gun possession to interstate
commerce.' The Court noted that the Act and the Act's legislative
history did not contain express congressional findings that possession
of a gun in a school zone affected interstate commerce." Because
48. 514 U.S. at 558-59.
49. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
50. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The Court
in Heart of Atlanta held that the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 are constitutional Id.
51. 234 U.S. at 355 (upholding the constitutionality of legislation that regulated
railroad rates).
52. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 563-64.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 561-62.
57. See id. at 562-63.
58. See id. at 562.
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there lacked a readily apparent connection between gun possession in
a school zone and interstate commerce, the Court remarked that the
absence of formal findings was significant. 9 Third, the Court noted
that there was no jurisdictional element establishing that the Act was
passed in pursuance to Congress' regulation of interstate commerce."
The lack of a discernible connection between commerce and gun
possession, the lack of congressional findings on the matter and the
missing jurisdictional element led the Court to strike down the Act as
exceeding Congress' commerce power. When Lopez was decided,
fifty-nine years had passed since the last time the Court struck down a
regulation as surpassing Congress' commerce power.6 Indeed, a
federal judge remarked that before Lopez "you wonder why anyone
would make the mistake of calling it the Commerce Clause instead of
the 'Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause."'6'2 Lopez was a
dramatic change in the Court's treatment of regulations enacted
under the Commerce Clause. Was Lopez an aberration or a signal of
the Court's new, limited delineation of Congress' Commerce power?
Five years later, the Court in Morrison arguably answered both
questions by reiterating its narrow construction of Congress'
commerce power.
D. United States v. Morrison
The Court in Morrison considered the constitutionality of
Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994." Section
13981 states that "persons within the United States shall have the
right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender.""
Section 13981 was enacted because Congress found that gender
crimes deter potential victims from traveling interstate and from
engaging in interstate business, diminish national productivity,
increase medical costs and decrease the demand and supply of
interstate products.6 Section 13981 (c) provides civil remedies in
either state or federal court for violations of the act.6 In Morrison,
Ms. Brzonkala, a student, raped by football players at her school,
59. See id. at 562-63.
60. See id. at 561.
61. See Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 309.
62. Kozinski, supra note 6, at 5.
63. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
64. 42 U.S.C. §13981 (b) (2000).
65. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (c) (2000).
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Virginia Polytechnic Institute, brought suit against her attackers
under Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act.67 Ms.
Brzonkala's attackers challenged Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause to enact Section 13981 of the Violence Against
Women Act.'
The Court in Morrison used Lopez as a framework for its
analysis. First, the Court examined the economic nature of the
regulated activity. The Court stated that "thus far in our Nation's
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature."6 9
The Court, citing Lopez, stated that if it were to accept the "costs of
crime" and "national productivity" arguments, then Congress could
regulate all violent crime, traditionally within the scope of the states'
police power.' Therefore, the Court concluded that "gender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity."'
Second, the Court stated that Section 13981 has no jurisdictional
element establishing that Congress' regulation of interstate commerce
creates the federal cause of action under Section 13981. Finally, the
Court held that although Congress had made findings connecting
gender violence to interstate commerce, the Constitution required a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.'
Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez, the enactment of
Section 13981 was supported by data demonstrating the connection
between violence against women and interstate commerce.'
However, the Court disregarded those Congressional findings.74
Instead, the Court asserted that "whether particular operations affect
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional
67. 529 U.S. at 602.
68. See id
69. lId at 613.
70. See id,
71. Id
72. See id. at 615.
73. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 629 (Souter, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Violence Against
Women, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House
Committee of the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); Hearing on Domestic Violence,
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (S.
Hearing 103-596); Violent Crimes Against Women, Hearing Before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (S. Hearing 103-726); Violence Against
Women: Fighting the Fear, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (S. Hearing 103-878).
74. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
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power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather
than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this
Court.""5 That is, the Court stated that only it could determine if
Congress was regulating a local, intrastate matter.
The Court's reasoning in Morrison, adopted from Lopez, has
been characterized as narrow and shallow.6 In both Lopez and
Morrison, the challenged statutes covered areas traditionally
regulated by the states' police power. Therefore, Morrison may only
exemplify the Court's application of Lopez to a similar set of facts.
Perhaps parties in future cases will successfully be able to argue
factual differences in their cases to prevent the Court's narrow
application of the Commerce Clause. However, it seems logical to
interpret Morrison as rendering it virtually impossible for Congress to
regulate any non-economic activity under the Commerce Clause.'
M. The ESA cannot be upheld under the Commerce Clause
A. Background of the ESA
Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 to "provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the
conservation of such endangered species."78 Congress declared that
"species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation
and its people."'79 To accomplish these goals, the ESA protects
endangered and threatened species listed pursuant to section four."
The ESA applies to both federal agency and private actions."
75. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, n.2).
76. See Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1454, 1517 n.258 (2000).
77. See Alan J. Heinrich, Symposium on New Directions in Federalism: Introduction,
33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2000).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
79. § 1531(a)(3).
80. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(a) (listing a species as endangered is done using the
best scientific and commercial data, taking current government actions into account).
Often, however, listing of a species becomes a highly politicized process. See also John
Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, MINN. L. REv. 1171 (1998) (discussing procedures
involved in listing a species and arguing that the Fish and Wildlife Service "plays Noah" in
the listing decision). The procedures and controversies surrounding a listing decision are
outside the scope of this Note.
81. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1538 (2000).
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Section nine of the ESA applies to private actions.' Section nine
prohibits any person from, among other things, importing or
exporting,' taking.' selling," shipping or selling in interstate
commerce" any listed endangered species.
The ESA defines "take" as meaning to "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage
in such conduct."" In Sweet Home v. Babbitt, ' the Supreme Court
upheld the Secretary of Interior's' definition of harm as including
significant habitat modification or degradation where such
modification or degradation actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns." Private
individuals, therefore, are prevented from "harming" listed species
and from modifying or degrading the habitat of listed species on their
property.
B. Constitutionality of ESA's Taking Prohibition
Morrison and Lopez provide the three part framework for
analyzing the constitutionality of a Commerce Clause regulation.
First, the Court should determine whether the ESA has a
jurisdictional element showing that Congress enacted the ESA
pursuant to its regulation of interstate commerce. The congressional
findings and declaration of purposes and policy of the ESA, like the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, do not mention interstate commerce, or
even commerce, as a goal of the statute.' Like the Violence Against
Women Act in Morrison, the ESA does not have a jurisdictional
element specifying that it was passed in pursuance of Congress'
commerce power. Therefore, the second issue is whether the ESA is
an economic activity.
The ESA does not have a substantial relation to interstate
82. See § 1538(a)(1).
83. See § 1538 (a)(1)(A).
84. See § 1538 (a)(1)(B).
85. See § 1538 (a)(1)(D).
86. See id.
87. See § 1538 (a)(1)(E).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19) (2000).
89. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
90. See id. at 691 (explaining that the Secretary has the authority to promulgate,
through the Fish and Wildlife Service, regulations that define terms in the ESA).
91. See id
92. See 16 U.S.C. §1531 (2000).
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commerce. Endangered species, like violent crime, are not an
economic activity. Tourism, hunting and scientific research generated
by endangered species may be economic activities. However, the
ESA's section nine taking prohibition does not regulate these
activities. It simply prohibits the "taking" of an endangered species.
There is an argument that endangered species have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, albeit a fragile link, through
ecotourism. 3 However, the flaw in this approach is that it examines
the effect that ecotourism, and not endangered species, has on
interstate commerce. This approach examines the secondary effect of
regulating endangered species on interstate commerce. The ESA
regulates endangered species that have no primary, direct effect on
interstate commerce. Allowing the regulation of endangered species
because they generate tourism, hunting, and research would permit
Congress to regulate all activities that may lead to the taking of an
endangered species "regardless of how tenuously they relate to
interstate commerce."94
Finally, following Lopez and Morrison, the Court must consider
the impact of the ESA on interstate commerce. The ESA, like the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, does not have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce that is "visible to the naked eye."95 The answer
to whether endangered species have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce depends largely on the scope of the analysis. What
constitutes the activity that must have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce?96 Is the "activity" the endangered specie,
endangered species as an aggregate, or the commercial activity
affecting an endangered specie, such as the construction of a home? 97
The Hawaii district court in Palila98 v. Hawaii Department of
Land and Natural Resources stated that the legislative history from
the ESA supported a connection with interstate commerce.99 The
Palila court stated that because Congress has determined that
endangered species are of national importance, enough to rise to a
93. See § 1531(a)(3).
94. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
95. Id. at 563.
96. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1049-52 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
97. See iL
98. "Palla" is actually the name of the endangered bird in the case. "For the first
time in American legal history a non-human became a plaintiff in court. Moreover, the
bird won!" ROD NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE 177 (1989).
99. 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'g, 471 F. Supp 985,994-95 (1979).
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level of national concern, Congress may regulate endangered species
under the Commerce Clause." A legislative report on a preceding
bill that contained the essential features of the ESA stated that "[i]t is
in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic
variations. The reason is quite simple: they are potential
resources. 10' The Palila court cited this report to confirm that "a
national program to protect.., endangered species preserves the
possibilities of interstate commerce in these species and of interstate
movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature or
professional scientists."'" This level of analysis, however, examines
the secondary effects of endangered species on interstate commerce.
The Palila bird, in fact, never left Hawaii and was never directly in
interstate commerce.103
The Palila court finds it sufficient that Congress determined that
endangered species are of national importance to hold that Congress
may regulate endangered species under its Commerce Clause
power. °4 Using this rationale, the Court could have upheld Section
13981 of the Violence Against Women Act as a constitutional
exercise of Congress' commerce power because gender violence rises
to a level of national concern. Under Morrison, the ESA cannot be
held as a constitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power simply because protecting endangered species rises to a level
of national concern. The Court would likely hold that rising to a level
of national concern is not equivalent to substantial effect on interstate
commerce. The Court's analysis, still, would depend on which
question is asked when analyzing Congress' power to regulate
endangered species. Is it the endangered specie, endangered species
as a whole, or the commercial activity affected by endangered species
that must substantially affect commerce?
In National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt, the
appellate judges split on which of the three approaches to take in
determining whether the ESA substantially affected interstate
commerce. 5 In that instance, landowners and local governments
challenged the taking provision of the ESA.'06 They claimed that the
100. 471 F. Supp. at 994-95.
101. H.R.REP. No. 93-412, at 5 (1973).
102. 471 F. Supp. at 995.
103. See id at 994.
104. Id. at 995.
105. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
106. See id. at 1044.
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ESA's prohibition against taking the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly,
an endangered specie, preventing the construction of an intersection
near a hospital, exceeded Congress' commerce power." Populations
of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly are found entirely in southern
California within an eight-mile radius."°
Judge Wald, writing for the court, held that section nine's
prohibition against taking the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly fit
within Lopez's first and third categories of constitutional regulation."
First, Judge Wald stated that the prohibition against taking the fly
was within the use of channels on interstate commerce because it aids
the prohibition against transporting and selling endangered species in
interstate commerce. 11°
Judge Wald then put forth a "biodiversity" rationale, arguing
that the extinction of a species "has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce by diminishing a natural resource that could otherwise be
used for present and future commercial purpose."'' Judge Wald
stated that the aggregate effect of the extinction of all similarly
situated endangered species had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
112
Perhaps taking an endangered specie not in interstate commerce
can "substantially affect" interstate commerce by affecting other
species or ecosystems in interstate commerce."1 Congress utilized this
rationale when enacting the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972
under its commerce power, reasoning that the disruption of marine
mammals not in interstate commerce may disturb ecosystems
affecting populations of animals that are the subject of interstate
commerce. 14 As one commentator noted, "this theory might at its
logical extreme support federal legislation with regard to everything
that is alive.""' 5
In Lopez, the Court voiced the same concern when striking down
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, that the government may regulate
any activity. "[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we
107. See id. at 1044-45.
108. See id. at 1044.
109. See id. at 1046-49.
110. See id. at 1046-47.
111. 11 at 1053.
112. See id. at 1046.
113. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 81-82.
114. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(5)(B) (1999).
115. THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 49 (1980).
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are hard pressed to posit any activity... that Congress is without
power to regulate." '116 The aggregate approach117 used in Judge Wald's
analysis is problematic in that, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act in
Lopez, the connection between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce is too attenuated and the possibility for regulation endless.
If the Court were to examine the direct connection between an
endangered specie and interstate commerce, the ESA would be held
unconstitutional.
Judge Henderson, in her concurring opinion, stated that the
appropriate gauge is whether the protection of the flies substantially
affects commercial development activity. 18  Judge Henderson's
approach does not analyze the primary effect of the fly on interstate
commerce either. It focuses, instead, on the secondary effects of the
fly on proposed construction. Judge Henderson's approach can be
characterized as the "commercial activity approach" because she
focuses her analysis on the effect of the prohibited construction and
interstate commerce. Judge Henderson concluded that the fly
affected plans to build a new intersection, therefore, the taking
prohibition substantially affected interstate commerce. 19
Judge Henderson's approach, like Judge Wald's proposition, has
too many links in the causal chain between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce. Using Judge Henderson's approach, any
legislation could be a constitutional exercise of Congress' commerce
power as long as it somehow affected interstate commerce through
commercial activity. Seemingly Morrison would have been
constitutional under this attenuated causal chain because gender
violence affects interstate travel that in turn has an effect on interstate
commerce. The Court explicitly rejected this approach in Morrison.12"
Dissenting Judge Sentelle stated that the killing of flies that live
in an eight-mile radius in southern California, not interstate and not
in commerce, cannot be regulated by Congress under the Commerce
Clause.' Judge Sentelle argued that the ESA, like the Gun-Free
School Zones Act challenged in Lopez, does not regulate commerce
116. 514 U.S. at 564.
117. See Lisa Wilson, Comment, Substantial Effects under Lopez: Using a Cumulative
Impact Analysis for Environmental Regulations, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 479, 480 (1998)
(arguing that the ESA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because the aggregate
effect of endangered species has a substantial impact on interstate commerce).
118. See Nat'lAss'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring).
119. See id. at 1057-60 (Henderson, J., concurring).
120. 529 U.S. at 598.
121. See 130 F.3d at 1061 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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because "[tlhere is no commerce in the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving
Fly."' " Judge Sentelle, looking at the individual specie, correctly
argued that a fly that lives completely intrastate cannot be said to
substantially affect interstate commerce.'1
3
If either Judge Wald's or Judge Henderson's approaches are
adopted, then the Court's concern raised in Lopez and Morrison that
the government may regulate any activity is applicable to the ESA.
Seemingly anything could harm an endangered species and, thus,
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Judge Sentelle also
voiced these concerns by repeatedly stating that using Judge Wald's
biodiversity approach and Judge Henderson's commercial activity
approach, he saw no stopping point to what Congress could regulate
under its commerce power."
The Court's analysis of congressional Commerce Clause
regulations in Morrison and Lopez raises serious doubt as to the
validity of the ESA's section nine taking prohibition. The Fourth
Circuit upheld ESA section nine in Gibbs v. Babbitt,'21 one month
after the Court decided Morrison. In Gibbs, cattle ranchers and
farmers challenged the ESA's section nine taking provision
prohibiting the taking of red wolves on their land.26 The Gibbs court
held that the taking of red wolves is an economic activity because the
protection of commercial and economic assets is a primary reason for
the farmers and cattle ranchers to kill or harm the wolves." The
Gibbs court stated that there is a direct connection between the
wolves and interstate commerce because of wolf-related tourism,
scientific research and commercial trade in pelts."
The Gibbs opinion is flawed in that, like Judges Henderson and
Wald in National Association of Home Builders, the analysis is
between interstate commerce and an activity related to endangered
species. The Gibbs court does not analyze the direct connection, if
any, between the red wolf and interstate commerce. Merely because
the red wolves generate tourism does not signify the wolves as an
economic or commercial activity. Basing such analysis is dangerous
where a protected endangered specie, such as a fly, does not generate
122. Id. at 1067 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
123. See id
124. See id.
125. 214 F.3d 483, 492 (4th Cir. 2000) (petition for cert. filed on November 22,2000).
126. See icL at 489.




tourism or scientific research. Could Congress only constitutionally
protect tourism-generating species? The Court might be answering
this question during this term as the farmers in Gibbs filed a petition
for certiorari on November 22,2000. Using the Commerce Clause as
a foundation for the ESA after Lopez and Morrison forces courts to
create irrational justifications to find a connection between
endangered species and interstate commerce.
IV. Congress' Property Power: Extending Over Public and
Private Lands
The Property Clause grants Congress the "[p]ower to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property belonging to the United States."'29 Congress has
power under the Property Clause to protect public lands from harm
and trespass, to control their occupancy and use, and stipulate the
conditions upon which others can gain rights in the lands.' Federal
public lands make up one third of all land in the United States."' And
in the eleven westernmost states, almost half of the land is federally
owned." States have jurisdiction over the federal public land within
their borders.133 If state law conflicts with federal law, however,
federal law preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause.'3 The
scope of Congress' property power is, therefore, important because
the federal government has jurisdiction over a vast amount of land.
In Camfield v. United States, the Court held that the federal
government enjoys the same rights over federal public land as does a
private landowner.35 Those rights include the ability to protect the
public lands from nuisances on adjoining private property." In
Camfield, the Court held that the federal government can regulate
private activity on private land when such activity interferes with the
129. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
130. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389,405 (1917).
131. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1 (1983).
132. See ATLAS OFTHE NEW WEST: PORTRAIT OF A CHANGING REGION 58 (William
E. Riebsame et al. eds., 1997). In Nevada, for instance, nearly eighty-three percent of the
state is federal public land compared with only seven-tenths of one percent in New York.
See id.
133. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
134. See id.; see also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,36 (1947).
135. 167 U.S. 518,526 (1897).
136. See id. at 524.
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public lands." The Court in Camfield invalidated the incidental
enclosure of public lands by fences constructed on private lands
resulting from the checkerboard land grant scheme relied upon by
Congress to encourage settlement and growth in the West."'
The Court in Kleppe v. New Mexico39 upheld the Camfield
doctrine stating that "the power granted by the Property Clause is
broad enough to reach beyond territorial limits."1"4 In Kleppe, the
Court held that the Property Clause also gives Congress the power to
protect wildlife on the public lands.4 In Kleppe, the New Mexico
Livestock Board challenged the Wild Free-roaming Horses and
Burros Act" as lying outside the scope of Congress' power under the
Property Clause.'43 The Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act
prohibits the capture, branding, harassment or killing of wild free-
roaming horses and burros." A landowner who discovers protected
horses or burros on his or her land may not destroy or remove the
animals but must inform the nearest federal marshal or agent of the
Secretary who will arrange to have the animals removed.145
The New Mexico Livestock Board raised the concern that the
Act's protection of animals that stray onto private land would extend
federal jurisdiction over every wild horse and burro that stepped on
federal land.146 The Court upheld the Wild Free-roaming Horses and
Burros Act as a constitutional exercise of congressional power under
the Property Clause.47 The Court, however, refused to answer the
extent that the Property Clause enables Congress to protect animals
on private land." The Court stated that "[w]e... leave open the
question of the permissible reach of the Act over private lands under
137. Id. at 524-25.
138. See id. at 520, 525-26. (illustrating the checkerboard land division system granting
odd-numbered sections of land to the railroads and reserving even-numbered sections for
disposal by the federal government).
139. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
140. Id. at 538.
141. Id. at 546.
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
143. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 534.
144. See 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (declaring that wild free-roaming horses and burros are
living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West).
145. See 16 U.S.C. § 1334.





the Property Clause." '149 Still, the Court did state that it was clear that
regulations under the Property Clause "may have some effect on
private lands not otherwise under federal control."'50 Kleppe remains
good law and courts have continued to uphold, but not broaden,
congressional power under the Property Clause.
V. The Property Clause: Congressional Authority for the ESA
Congress' regulation of the "taking" of endangered species under
the Property Clause avoids the problems related to connecting
endangered species to interstate commerce."' The decision regarding
whether Judge Wald's biodiversity, Judge Henderson's commercial
activity, or Judge Sentelle's individual specie approach should be
applied is never reached. The effect of wiping out a species is not
entirely known.5 Scientific data cannot prove that the extinction of
one species does not affect others.53 The Property Clause approach
validates congressional concern for endangered species because the
extinction of one species could logically have an effect on other
species located on federal land. Indeed, a reason for the enactment of
the ESA was to protect "the unforeseeable place that such creatures
may have in the chain of life on this planet."'"
It is more logical to argue that the extinction of one species could
affect other species on federal land, however, than to claim that
extinction of a non-commercial species affects endangered species as
an aggregate that in turn affects interstate commerce. The causal
chain is much less attenuated in the former approach because the
effect of the endangered species on interstate commerce is directly
examined. This approach is somewhat related to Judge Wald's
biodiversity argument. Instead of asking what secondary affects the
149. Id. at 547.
150. Id. at 546.
151. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Dehli Sands
Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REv. 174, 186-87 (1998) (arguing that the choice in
connecting endangered species is between a biodiversity or ecosystem approach).
152. Compare CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE: THE
FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 122 (citing an estimate that "the loss of one species of
plant eliminates en passant ten to thirty other species) with id. at 130-32 (arguing that it is
possible to distinguish the value of species).
153. See Nagle, supra note 80, at 1210-11 (noting that endangered species serve a
canary-in-the-mine function so that a loss may serve as an early warning that the rest of
the ecosystem is in danger). See also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr 179-82 (1995).
154. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,179 (1978).
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regulation of an endangered species has on interstate commerce, the
approach under the Property Clause looks at the primary effect of an
endangered specie on federal property. Locating Congress' power to
regulate endangered species under the Property Clause is also a
sensible approach. The Court has already upheld the regulation of
animals on private and federal land." Regulating endangered species
on private land fits within this category of permissible regulation
under the Property Clause.
VI. Conclusion
This note provides an alternative for establishing the
constitutionality of the ESA's section nine prohibition against taking
an endangered specie. The Property Clause is a logical source of
congressional power to regulate endangered species. Conserving
endangered species and their habitats is a national priority because of
scientific uncertainty regarding their loss. Therefore, providing a
solid constitutional foundation for the regulation of endangered
species should be of equal importance.
155. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546.
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